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Towards a sociology of institutional transparency: openness, deception, and the prob-
lem of public trust 
 
Abstract 
 
Transparency has become the watchword of twenty-first century liberal democracies. It re-
fers to a project of ‘opening up’ the state by providing online access to public sector data. 
This article puts forward a sociological critique of the transparency agenda and the pur-
ported relationship between institutional openness and public trust. Drawing upon Simmel’s 
(1906) work, the article argues that open government initiatives routinely prize visibility 
over intelligibility and ignore the communicative basis of trust. The result is a non-recipro-
cal form of openness that obscures more than it reveals. In making this point, the article sug-
gests that transparency embodies the ethos of a now-discredited mode of ‘instrumental poli-
tics’, reliant on the idea that the state constitutes a ‘domain of plain public facts’ (Ezrahi, 
2004: 106). The article examines how alternative mechanisms for achieving government 
openness might better respond to the distinctive needs of citizens living in late modern soci-
eties. 
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Towards a sociology of institutional transparency: openness, deception, and the prob-
lem of public trust 
 
 Increasing the public’s access to state agencies’ processes and data has become a 
core aim of twenty-first century public policy. In the UK hospitals are now required to pub-
lish a range of statistics on patient outcomes, members of the public can make a freedom of 
information request, and schools must make data on high-performing and under-performing 
students publicly available. Such initiatives are not specific to this country. Barack Obama’s 
flagship Open Government programme, launched on his first day in office, sought to pro-
duce an ‘unprecedented’ level of public access to the work of state agencies (Obama, 2009). 
This has resulted in, amongst other things, the online publication of public bodies’ perfor-
mance data, the broadcasting of as-live feeds from courtrooms and public enquiries, and 
open access to the spending records of government agencies. Initiatives such as these are 
aimed at opening up the state by making its bureaucratic operations — mainly its data-out-
puts — visible online. They are widely referred to in terms of ‘transparency’. Despite the 
cultural currency of this term, there has been a lack of attention paid to the purpose, mean-
ing, and effectiveness of transparency. It is, as Gupta (2008:1) puts it, ‘an overused but un-
der-analysed concept’, largely, it might reasonably be suggested, because its value seems 
self-evident.  
 
This article attends to this omission by setting out a sociological critique of the transparency 
agenda. It does so partly on the basis that scrutinising what transparency means and how it 
operates are necessary steps in working out what it achieves. Transparency promises to 
make citizens more informed, engaged, and better able to understand and trust the state. 
Asking whether (and in what sense) it is able to achieve these goals is not just a matter of 
evaluating a core plank of public policy; it means enquiring into the normative basis of the 
relationship between the state and the public in twenty-first century liberal democracies. 
This is what I take to be important about the task of unpacking transparency: it leads us to 
ask foundational sociological questions about how the state conceives of its role in engaging 
the public and what it means to have an open democracy.  
 
To that end, this article traces the emergence, meaning, and function of institutional trans-
parency. Following Ezrahi (2004), transparency programmes are taken to participate in a 
particular construction of the state and its citizens, one that sees the former as having a 
purely informational role and the latter as primarily witnesses to the mundane work of the 
state. This, as Ezrahi (2004) notes, is an idea that is now threatened by a countervailing dis-
course that takes truth to be contingent, especially if that ‘truth’ issues from the political 
realm. This article extends Ezrahi’s (2004) argument by engaging with Shilling and Mel-
lor’s (2015) essay in this Journal detailing how late modernity involves distinctive possibili-
ties for doubleness and duplicity. This provides an additional strain on the political fiction 
on which transparency relies; that is, the idea that open data serves as a window to the inner-
workings of the state. This suggests that the relationship between transparency and public 
trust may be far less self-evident than is regularly presumed in policy documents. The pe-
nultimate section of the article focuses on this point, drawing upon Simmel’s (1906) work 
on secrecy to argue that transparency neglects the communicative basis of trust and depends 
upon a decidedly non-reciprocal form of openness. The article goes on to explore how alter-
native models of state-citizen relations might open up opportunities for reciprocal transpar-
ency and more deliberate forms of democracy. 
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The origin and meaning of institutional transparency 
 
The UK and USA were the first to launch public sector transparency initiatives (Margetts, 
2014: 168). In the UK this was done tentatively at first, with the New Labour administration 
appointing two cross-department advisors in 2009 to increase the availability of government 
data. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition, elected in 2010, went further in pro-
moting transparency, albeit by pursuing non-statutory measures (Birkinshaw, 2014: 52-3). 
During their first year in office they oversaw the creation of a Public Sector Transparency 
Board and the launch of data.gov.uk, a data-hub publishing public sector datasets on health, 
education, transport, and crime and justice (Cabinet Office, 2012). The aim of this initiative, 
as with transparency programmes more generally, is to push out online as much state-pro-
duced data as possible; the emphasis, in other words, is on the near-instantaneous publica-
tion of large volumes of data (Cabinet Office, 2012). 
 
The USA’s public sector transparency programme was launched with more aplomb, with 
President Obama signing the ‘Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government’ on 
his first day in office in 2009. The Memorandum pledged a commitment to achieving ‘an 
unprecedented level of openness in government’ and asserted transparency as a core value 
of democracy (Obama, 2009). This idea was quickly taken up elsewhere: by 2011 Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Morocco, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and France had all launched compa-
rable transparency programmes to those of the UK and USA (Margetts, 2014: 169). This de-
velopment in domestic policy was accompanied by a shift in the language and aims of inter-
national partnership. Driven principally by the USA, transparency is now a priority for the 
United Nations as well as the Open Government Partnership, a multi-lateral organisation 
that was created in 2011 to promote transparency-related programmes around the world 
(Open Government Partnership, 2015). Government transparency has, within a very short 
space of time, come to be seen as a universal value and been incorporated into the language 
of twenty-first century public policy and administration. It has achieved a place in the cul-
ture as a self-evident principle of democratic governance, even entering the patter of high-
ranking government officials in the most recent film in the Mission Impossible franchise. 
All this begs the question: where did the idea and language of transparency come from? 
 
One important factor is the emergence of the Internet and its facilitation of what Taylor 
(2004) calls a ‘direct-access society’, that is, a society in which we expect individuals and 
organisations to be immediately available to us, albeit virtually and partially. Taylor points 
out — and he is not without antecedent here — that the direct-access society has helped re-
shape our shared conception of the social world, away from a top-down pyramidical struc-
ture and towards a ‘lateral, horizontal view’ of society, as if it were ‘laid out in a tableau 
without privileged nodal points’ (Taylor 2004: 158). This is precisely the view of society 
encapsulated in twenty-first century transparency programmes. Here, we are offered a snap-
shot view of what various public sector organisations are doing, if not quite ‘right now’, 
then as near as possible to it. We can access, amongst other things, the test results of this 
year’s cohort of school pupils, today’s Court of Appeal hearing, and the current records for 
hospital admissions. All of this information is forever updated and in a manner that declares 
that data is issued automatically, without prejudice or design. It forms, to return to Taylor 
(2004), an ever-growing, flat landscape of data.  
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From this perspective, transparency is bound up with a broader socio-cultural current — or, 
as Taylor (2004: 157) has it, contributes to a social imaginary that is premised on a ‘radical 
horizontality’. There are other ways of approaching twenty-first century transparency. It is 
also possible to see it as an answer to a direct threat to the state’s legitimacy, one that is inti-
mately connected to the rise of the Internet and the decentering of power and authority to 
which Taylor alludes. I’m thinking here of the emergence of the anti-secrecy group Wik-
iLeaks in late 2006 and, in 2010, the organisation’s dissemination of classified documents 
and whistle-blowers’ accounts. This material became the basis for probing news reports on 
US military action. Beyond this, and more importantly for our purposes, it made the issue of 
government secrecy headline news.  
 
WikiLeaks represents another, broader problem for twenty-first century governments, 
namely that government data held electronically can be hacked and widely-disseminated via 
the Internet. Thus, as Brito (2010: 241) puts it, ‘[w]hen government refuses to make itself 
transparent and open and fails to make public information meaningfully available, hackers 
will liberate the data’. From this perspective, transparency is a preventative measure. For 
some, it serves also as a check on the culture of distrust that has emerged in a post-Wik-
iLeaks era, or, put more cynically, a ‘front end or shallow veneer on an otherwise secretive 
and closed governmental organisation’ (Margetts, 2014: 169). One thing that might per-
suade us of the rhetorical function of transparency is the striking similarity of government 
transparency initiatives to anti-secrecy campaigns. Both construe the online publication of 
large sets of unedited official documents as constituting a moment of truth. Certainly, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the work of anti-secrecy groups has influenced the meaning and 
operation of government transparency. 
 
The guerrilla tactics of groups like WikiLeaks are part of a cultural shift in which the hidden 
work of the state has come to be widely seen as a threat to democracy. Pressure groups such 
as openDemocracy and Democracy International have played a central role in this shift, by 
pushing both the private sector to reveal more data about environmental impact and the pub-
lic sector to reveal more about government spending (Peters, 2013: 537). As a brief aside 
here, it is worth noting that the private sector has in the main supported and contributed to 
the push for greater transparency. Government data, after all, has a commercial value, and 
policy documents indicate that companies have been key beneficiaries of transparency pro-
grammes (see, for example,  Cabinet Office, 2012). 
 
This is to note the role of external, non-governmental drivers of transparency. The move to-
wards a data-driven audit culture within the public sector has also played a key role. This 
was a shift that began in the mid-1980s, with public sector organisations becoming subject 
to routine audits aimed at assessing and measuring their performance — the so-called new 
public management. As Power (1999) observes, auditing serves as a powerful tool for regu-
lating work. Whether it is a school’s exam results or a police force’s arrest targets, under-
performance is deemed to be a problem with indigenous causes; the responsibility, in other 
words, resides with the individual school, prison, or local council. In this sense, public sec-
tor data is performative. That is, it does work to define and enforce a particular vision of in-
stitutional success, one based on the decidedly narrow criteria of efficiency and end-results. 
 
The rise of an audit culture within the public sector was an important precursor to transpar-
ency. Others suggest that the essential principle of open government embodied in twenty-
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first century open data programmes has been around for quite some time. Peters (2013: 
537), for example, sees government transparency as the logical extension of the freedom of 
information reforms undertaken in many economically-developed countries during the late 
twentieth century. In the UK, these reforms eventuated in the Freedom of Information Act 
in 2000, a piece of legislation that has had an extraordinary impact on journalists and cam-
paign groups’ ability to hold the political elite to account, leading, most notably, to the MPs 
expenses scandal in 2009. The political debate about freedom of information and govern-
ment openness is in fact a long-running one, dating back to the post-Second World War pe-
riod (Chapman, 2011: 11-12). Thus, in discussing precursors to twenty-first century trans-
parency, some point to the newly-created international organisations of the 1940s and their 
promotion of freedom of information both as a human right and a key responsibility for 
democratic, open governments (Chapman, 2011: 12).  
 
There is, then, an important pre-history to transparency. To see transparency as old wine in 
new bottles is, though, to miss the important ways in which it differs from earlier concep-
tions of freedom of information. One key distinction lies in the fact that where freedom of 
information was generally reactive, depending upon pressure groups and the public to iden-
tify and request information, transparency seeks to be proactive. The point is to offer, un-
prompted, a full and frank disclosure of what is going on within public agencies and depart-
ments — though, as discussed below, what transparency initiatives deliver is actually some-
thing far narrower than this. Nonetheless, conceptually, transparency is about a ‘culture of 
candor’, as the after-the-colon title of one of the earliest management books on the subject 
puts it (Bennis, Goleman, and O’Toole, 2008). There are other differences between trans-
parency and freedom of information. For example, in its twentieth century formulation, 
freedom of information was seen as just one factor in the realisation of open government. 
Thus, in an influential 1987 edited collection addressing the political challenges of institut-
ing open government policies in the UK, Chapman refers to ‘open government’ as ‘the abil-
ity of the public in a democracy to hold the government fully accountable for its actions and 
to assess the validity of actions taken’ (Chapman, 2011: 11). Here, governments are ‘open’ 
due to the actions of the public, the underlying principle being that the relationship between 
citizens and the state is based on collaboration (Cohen, 2014). Freedom of information is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for this relationship. 
 
In contrast, in twenty-first century open government programmes, the dissemination of in-
formation — or, transparency — is regularly taken to be both a means-to-an-end and an 
end-in-itself (Backer 2013: 478). Open government, in turn, now tends to be conceived of as 
a condition achieved by the state, rather than a two-way relationship between the state and 
its citizens (see, for example, Cabinet Office, 2012; Open Government Partnership, 2015). 
Thus a 2010 edited collection defines ‘open government’ as ‘the notion that the people have 
the right to access the documents and proceedings of government’ (Lathrop and Ruma, 
2010: xix). In this articulation of ‘open government’, the public play a decidedly passive 
role. ‘Access’, here, is something a government grants by publishing documents and pro-
ceedings, rather than something the public does. Where the public’s ability to access infor-
mation does feature as an issue in twenty-first century debates about transparency and open 
government, it is conceived of in very narrow terms, as a matter of data formatting and ex-
portability (see, for example, Cabinet Office, 2012). Broader concerns about accessibility — 
the public’s ability to comprehend and assess government data — as well as the public’s 
ability to act on what is made visible, are almost entirely absent from today’s transparency 
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initiatives.  Peters (2013: 535) concedes as much when she suggests that institutional trans-
parency means ‘the mere accessibility of information’ (Peters, 2013: 535), and, again, she 
means ‘accessibility’ in a narrow sense, as a matter of information being in the public do-
main. By way of distinction, she points out that ‘publicity’ refers to ‘the fact that infor-
mation is actually accessed’. ‘[T]ransparency’, she adds, ‘is no guarantee that publicity will 
really come about’ (Peters, 2013: 535). In other words, transparency does not serve as a 
mechanism for communicating with the public; it is about filing information in a virtual 
space to which the public have been permitted access. 
 
One reasonable objection here is that lay members of the public are not the intended users of 
open data, but rather campaign groups, journalists, think-tanks, and companies digest and 
filter data on the public’s behalf. Certainly, these groups are better able to locate, sift, and 
make sense of the information, and, in the case of journalists, have been innovative in their 
use of open data to illuminate how the state spends public funds. This view of open data, its 
users and beneficiaries, ignores the rhetoric of transparency, its stated purpose, as well as its 
potential as a form of dialogue between the state and its citizens. Put simply, as a political 
discourse, transparency refers to the state’s relationship to the public. Take, by way of ex-
ample, Obama’s (2009) ‘Memorandum’, where transparency sits alongside public collabo-
ration and participation as core objectives of open government. Transparency is presented 
here, and elsewhere, as central to the project of participatory democracy. Yet the nature of 
and basis for the relationship between government openness and public participation re-
mains obscure. Thus, most initiatives launched as part of the USA’s Open Government pro-
gramme — for which the ‘Memorandum’ serves as a declaration of purpose — are focussed 
on openness as something achieved unilaterally by the state. Transparency, in other words, 
is the privileged goal, and it is frequently treated as its own reward. 
 
It is worth pausing here to note another idiosyncrasy of twenty-first century transparency, 
and that is the elision of the state with its administrative and performance data. Take the fact 
that, in the UK, as in the USA, the main action taken in ‘building a transparent society’ has 
been to get each government department to produce an Open Data Strategy that commits to 
the routine publication of datasets (Cabinet Office, 2012: 11). In both countries, government 
agencies and departments are urged to radically alter their mindset and adopt the view that 
‘all data must be freed’, as the US Open Data programme puts it (Peled, 2011: 2085). De-
spite this, much public sector data remains unpublished. Indeed, one of the common criti-
cisms of institutional transparency is that government agencies fail to comply with top-
down requests to publish data (Birkinshaw, 2014; Cohen, 2014; Koelkebeck 2010; Peled, 
2011). This body of literature tends to approach transparency as an unfinished project. What 
is rarely considered is the effectiveness of ‘putting the data out there’, as the UK Open Data 
White Paper describes the project of transparency (Cabinet Office, 2012: 11). In this docu-
ment and elsewhere, government data is seen as most empowering when it is automatically 
‘pushed out’. For Margetts (2014: 167) such an approach means that government open data 
initiatives are exercises in ‘dump[ing] data for the sake of it’. This, she points out, risks cre-
ating a ‘deluge’ of data that is overwhelming and incomprehensible, that inhibits, rather 
than facilitates, lay members of the public knowing more about the work of the state (Mar-
getts, 2014). 
 
The problem here is not so much a lack of regard for the end-user of government open data, 
but rather — to return to the point made above — how transparency programmes conceive 
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of the relationship between the public and the state. In the UK Open Data White Paper 
‘pushing out’ reams of data is conceived of as the best route to transparency on the basis 
that each individual has specific needs that can only be met by a personal sifting of the in-
formation (Cabinet Office, 2010). In other words, it is individuals who ‘know best how to 
make the decisions that shape their lives…as long as they have all the information at their 
fingertips’ (Cabinet Office, 2012: 11). From this perspective, second-guessing citizens’ 
needs in using the data dampens innovation. Instead, the Open Data White Paper insists that 
government data should be seen as ‘raw material’ that can be harvested by individuals to 
make better personal choices (Cabinet Office, 2012). The expectation is that the public will 
approach this data in such a way that operationalises their idiosyncratic and fluid needs as 
citizen-consumers, then ‘vote…with their feet’ and thereby provide a check on the quality 
of public services (Cabinet Office, 2012: 12). Lest this appears to be a conception of trans-
parency that is distinctive to European, post-welfare regimes, it is of note that the USA’s 
National Action Plans also repeatedly frame transparency as a means of ensuring a competi-
tive public sector (Open Government Partnership 2011; Open Government Partnership 
2013). 
 
None of this is to suggest that government transparency programmes entirely eschew the 
idea of a collective public. Such programmes frequently claim to promote public trust — it 
is there in the opening paragraph of Obama’s (2009) Memorandum, and serves as the basis 
for a stand-alone chapter in the UK’s Open Data White Paper (Cabinet Office, 2012). The 
presumption in these documents, and others besides, is that public trust is a fragile thing that 
needs buoying, or ‘building’, as the UK White Paper repeatedly puts it. The public is con-
ceived of here as a combative body of opinion, rather than an active collaborator in the pro-
ject of open government. In fact, a distrustful public is lightly-drawn in these documents. 
Whilst improving public trust is presented as central to the project of transparency, the lev-
ers of public trust are given little consideration. The UK White Paper, for example, repeat-
edly pictures the relationship in a graphic that shows ‘enhanced access’ as an arrow leading 
to ‘building trust’, but omits to provide any evidence for this apparently cause-and-effect re-
lationship, nor discuss the mediating factors that might shape it (Cabinet Office, 2012). This 
article turns now to consider why transparency initiatives routinely take the relationship be-
tween transparency and public trust to be self-evident. 
 
Transparency as instrumental politics 
 
In his account of the performative foundations of democracy, Ezrahi (2004) points out that 
the emergence of liberal democracy in the West was based upon a social imaginary where 
common-sense realism — a sense of the world as subject to laws of causation and ‘real’ in 
its material aspects — became the dominant political epistemology. One consequence of 
what Ezrahi calls the ‘demystification of the political’ is ‘the association of the real with the 
visible [and] the belief in ocular witnessing as the guarantor of factuality’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 
104). To put it simply, political authority came to be based on things that could be shown 
and seen, rather than metaphysical forces. Central to this shift, Ezrahi (2004) notes, is the 
gradual emergence, starting in the seventeenth century, of politics as a discrete sphere of ac-
tivity separate from the Arts and religion, which in turn became associated with fantasy and 
the imagination. Thus, Ezrahi argues, the line between fact and fiction was firmly drawn. 
Borrowing a scientistic language, politics and statecraft became the realm of literalism, de-
mocracy synonymous with a ‘domain of plain public facts’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 106). 
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For Ezrahi, the apotheosis of this development was the emergence of what he calls instru-
mental politics, a political mode that involves framing the work of the state as dispassionate, 
ends-oriented, mundane, and, above all else, visible. The materialisation of the state through 
statistics, publicity, and transparency are, he argues, crucial to this political fiction because 
the sheer act of manifesting the state as an external reality is ‘a precondition for the percep-
tion of factuality’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 174), much in the same way that Durkheim’s conception of 
society as a reality sui generis serves as a precondition for social facts. In the realm of poli-
tics, Ezrahi (2004) argues, the idea that the state resides in an edifice of brute facts has al-
lowed for the depoliticisation of decisions taken by governments,  the discourse of ‘best evi-
dence’ participating in a fiction that democracy is a material entity, with measurable and ob-
jective ‘needs’. Central to this political fiction, Ezrahi argues, is the work done to call ‘the 
public’ into being. Indeed, it is ‘the public’ that lends legitimacy to the instrumental mode 
of politics, their ‘presumed continual gaze’ attesting to the idea that democracy can be 
found — actually, literally found — in the administrative records of the state (Ezrahi, 2004: 
105). 
 
Thinking about the performative foundations of modern democracy should prompt us to rec-
ognise that transparency contributes to a political fiction that the state’s role is to reveal it-
self in its bureaucratic operations and the public’s role is to lay witness. As Ezrahi (2004) 
convincingly argues, this is a view of state-citizen relations that has decreasing cultural pur-
chase. For him, an important driver of this shift is the rise of social media and its dissemina-
tion of alternative versions of reality. The backdrop to this, he argues, is the postmodern 
turn and the decline of old, cherished categories of truth and reality, which have come to be 
seen as contingent, perspectival, and fluid. We are witnessing, Ezrahi (2004) argues, the 
‘end of the external’, the end, that is, of the idea that ‘assertions about the properties of the 
world [can be separated] from particular worldviews’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 263). This shift has had 
a really significant impact on the social imagination and, with it, our conception of democ-
racy and politics. One consequence is the decline of democracy as a stable external referent, 
and the emergence, in its place, of the idea that official accounts of the state are one-sided 
and disputable. The effect, Ezrahi (2004) argues, is that doubt is cast on the political realm’s 
claims to factuality, the most obvious manifestation of which is the widespread perception 
that politicians are given to falsehood and disingenuous posturing. This has important impli-
cations for the meaning and operation of transparency, and we turn to these now. 
 
Transparency, doubleness, and deception 
 
Ezrahi’s (2004) account of the rise and fall of instrumental politics points to a potential 
threat to the legitimacy of transparency. In a social context where different versions of 
events proliferate, and there is less primacy given to official accounts, anything an organisa-
tion is known or perceived to do can be factored into the public reception of institutional 
openness, if not as something that is officially on show, then as something that the state has 
seemingly tried to hide. If, for example, there is an upsurge of social media reports concern-
ing incidents of police racism and official data published online appears to contradict this 
view, it is at least a possibility that the latter will be taken as a flat denial of the former, and, 
more than this, part of the problem. Shilling and Mellor’s (2015) recent contribution to this 
journal is useful in helping us think through exactly what ‘the problem’ might be. They ar-
gue that late modernity has given rise to new possibilities for duplicity, both at the level of 
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the individual and the organisation. The growth of geographical mobility, social media, and 
reflective decision-making have, they suggest, produced novel opportunities for us to self-
consciously promote different versions of the self. Like Ezrahi (2004), Shilling and Mellor 
(2015) are interested in the idea that late modernity has given rise to alternative realities that 
blur the distinction between fact and fiction. Unlike Ezrahi (2004), they are expressly con-
cerned with how this feeds into a pervasive sense that the modern world is prone to double-
ness — not just a sense that there is a potentially huge range of alternative realities, but that 
there is a stark split between a contrived ‘reality’ and a hidden realm of the real. 
 
Contemporary social theory has been centrally concerned with the effects of doubleness on 
the individual, particularly in terms of a perceived split between her private and public per-
sonae. Indeed, for some, a characteristic feature of late modernity is the prizing of the pri-
vate, inner self as the ‘real me’ and the parallel rejection of the idea that identity stems from 
public roles and membership to social groups (see, amongst others, Bauman, 2004; Camp-
bell, 1987; Sennett, 2003). Sociologists have had relatively little to say about the problems 
twenty-first century organisations encounter in negotiating their identities as public-facing 
and open, but it might reasonably be suggested that the late modern presumption of double-
ness poses an existential problem here too. If, to return to Shilling and Mellor (2015), mod-
ern organisations are commonly perceived to be prone to duplicity, the question of what is 
on show and its relationship to reality becomes particularly pressing. Transparency, in this 
context, is more likely to frustrate than assuage concerns about doubleness, not least of all 
because it expressly denies the possibility that anything is being hidden. The very word 
‘transparency’ precludes any discussion of institutional openness as necessarily contingent 
and partial, asserting, as it does, that information has been transposed directly and without 
mediating effects. To present institutional openness in this way — as free from decisions 
about what gets shown — is to risk public cynicism, especially, as Ezrahi (2004) points out, 
in a cultural context where politics appears prone to dissimulation. 
 
Transparency and the problem of public trust: how can we trust what we see? 
 
Transparency, and instrumental politics more broadly, depends upon the idea that the more 
the state shows the public, the more the public will trust the state. As argued above, this is 
dependent upon an out-dated idea that the public perceive truth to reside in the ‘domain of 
plain public facts’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 106). The transparency agenda also misconceives the dis-
tinctive features of trust at the organisational level and its relationship to visibility, and it is 
this point that we turn to next. Simmel (1906), in his writing on secrecy and trust, makes 
some important observations about the difference between what Luhmann (1979) and Gid-
dens (1991) would later call individual-level and system trust. Imagine, Simmel writes, the 
problem of trusting a local market trader (Simmel, 1906: 447). She loudly hawks her wares 
— “these are the best vegetables in town!” — and we strongly suspect that her selling patter 
is deceitful because it is so obviously self-interested. In contrast, when we enter a store — a 
supermarket, perhaps — the problem of distrust is of another sort. For one thing, we do not 
think that shop assistants are liable to dupe us into buying the shop’s wares; they have no 
personal interest in us doing so. Distrust lies elsewhere: it lies with the unseen organisation. 
Simmel suggests that distrust of the market trader, though perhaps more visceral, is also 
more easily off-set, and this is because our direct interaction with her makes her deception 
more intelligible to us. It also allows us to negotiate our mutual interests: her, to earn more, 
me, to pay less. Simmel refers to this as ‘reciprocal transparency’ (Simmel, 1906: 448): it is 
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a social situation wherein we come to understand each other’s aims and meanings more 
clearly because we have each forced the other to make her motives more evident. The abil-
ity to see the market trader — the self-interested party — is part of this, but interaction and 
negotiation provide the means whereby we can make sense of what we see of her and work 
out what remains hidden from us.  
 
There are several implications here for our understanding of institutional transparency. Sim-
mel prompts us to recognise that visibility in and of itself does not promote trust. The glass-
fronted boardroom that overlooks the factory floor might allow workers to look at company 
big-wigs, but it does not make the decisions that are made therein more intelligible. Simi-
larly, criminal justice statistics might allow us to ‘see’ the decisions made within our courts, 
but they do not make that work comprehensible. Nor do they make the criminal justice insti-
tution more accessible to us; it is the individual incumbents of the system that are revealed 
to us, not the organisation. Just as when we walk into a supermarket and do not hold the 
shop assistant to account for the decisions made by the organisation, we understand that 
those who enforce the law are operating within structures and parameters set by the (still 
hidden) institution. More than this, institutional transparency is unreciprocal; there is no ne-
gotiation of what is shown on the basis of what each needs to see in order to trust the other. 
 
It might be tempting to see these as intractable problems; public institutions can not, after 
all, forge the same communicative bases for trust as individuals. They can, though, establish 
robust means for citizens to scrutinise, make sense of, and act on information. As discussed 
above, this conception of public access is currently absent from transparency programmes, 
focused as they are on the importance of ‘pushing out’ data. It is in the field of political phi-
losophy that we find the most interest in alternative models of open democracy where the 
state plays an expanded role in disseminating information. Forst (2014), for example, argues 
for a model of deliberative democracy that safeguards citizens’ right to justification, that is, 
the right to demand the state justifies its actions and decisions. In practical terms, this means 
‘that there be no political or social relations of governance that cannot be adequately justi-
fied to those affected by them’ (Forst, 2014: 2, italics added). This conception of state-citi-
zen relations requires the state to do more than simply ‘push out’ data; for governance to be 
‘adequately justified’, the state must take an active role in explaining, evidencing, and de-
fending decisions and actions. Thus, Forst (2014: 181) suggests that a necessary precondi-
tion of the right to justification is a strong public sphere of ‘information, argumentation, and 
contestation’. Key to this is the promotion of citizens’ rights to object to an official decision 
or version of events, and here Forst (2014) points to the importance of robust judicial mech-
anisms for contesting the official line.  
 
For Forst (2014), such mechanisms create the conditions for participatory democracy. For 
Papakostas (2012), there is something else at stake. In his theoretical study of state-level 
trust in European countries he argues that citizens’ ability to closely scrutinise the work 
done by state agencies is a means of improving public trust. Papakostas (2012) suggests that 
liberal democracies should embrace the late modern tendency to approach state power from 
a position of cynicism and give citizens the tools that enable them to inhabit a position of 
‘structured skepticism’. A particularly important mechanism, for Papakostas (2012), is the 
publication of rational explanations for the institutional rules and processes that shape offi-
cial decisions. To be clear, he is by no means suggesting that the state ought to release more 
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information. The real problem, to Papakostas’ (2012) mind, is that late modern states’ ad-
ministrative processes have become overly complex and, at times, irrational. ‘Structured 
skepticism’ thus depends not just on greater depth of information and more context to the 
state’s decisions; it requires the state’s processes to be simplified so that they can be more 
readily explained and understood. A similar point might be made about transparency: the 
problem of voluminous, raw open data is exacerbated by the fact that public sector pro-
cesses have become increasingly inscrutable.    
 
Both Papakostas (2012) and Forst (2014) believe the state has a responsibility to make its 
work intelligible, and not simply visible to the public. More than that, their work is deeply 
suggestive of the fact that the benefits of transparency (such as improved public trust) only 
accrue if work is done to equip people with the means of making sense of and acting upon 
public data. To see transparency in this way — as one of several mutually-dependent factors 
in the creation of open democracy — means thinking about it alongside mechanisms such as 
access to justice and education, public participation in official fora, and collective associa-
tions (which have historically played a key role in challenging the official line). As a brief 
aside here, it is striking that these forms of provision and participation have undergone a 
very significant decline in the last few decades. We might have much more public data 
available to us, but, for many people, the means by which we might understand, act upon, 
and collectively challenge that information have been slowly eroded. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
This article concludes by identifying a set of problems with institutional transparency and 
exploring how alternative routes to government openness might point the way to an era of 
post-instrumental politics. This critique forms the basis for a new, sociological approach to 
transparency, one that seeks to scrutinise and theorise the model of state-citizen relations to 
which transparency answers. This approach is principally directed towards denaturalising 
the aims, ethos, and achievements of transparency. This means, amongst other things, ask-
ing how transparency programmes conceive of ‘the public’, reflecting upon the state’s role 
and responsibility in opening up the state to public scrutiny, and considering the function of 
transparency as a rhetorical device.  
 
A sociology of institutional transparency should also be directed towards researching and 
theorising the communicative bases for public participation and trust in the state. This arti-
cle has argued that the transparency agenda is based on a simplistic conception of the rela-
tionship between visibility and public trust that sees the former as a straightforward condi-
tion for the latter. In developing this point, future research might examine the tendency 
within transparency programmes to conceive of the public through the lens of trust, in terms 
of a problem to be solved rather than a co-participant in the creation of an open society. A 
broader aim here might be to highlight and explain the absence within transparency pro-
grammes of an underpinning conception of the relationship between the state and the public 
— its character, bases, and the responsibilities on each side. This article has suggested that 
this is no accidental omission. In transparency programmes, the core responsibility of gov-
ernment agencies is to ‘push out’ as much data as possible, the presumption being that indi-
viduals are best placed to sift the information and decide its uses (not, it should be added, 
because they have been equipped with the skills and abilities to interpret the data, but be-
cause they are discerning citizen-consumers). It is an approach based upon the idea that the 
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state’s role is to manifest itself in a ‘domain of plain public facts’ (Ezrahi, 2004: 106) and 
the public acts as a homogenous group of spectators. A sociological approach involves lay-
ing bare this set of assumptions, and, as part of this, revealing transparency’s lack of interest 
in what the public might need to know, how people approach official data, and the uses to 
which they put it.  
 
This should prompt us to recognise that if transparency is supposed to serve no-one in par-
ticular, there’s a risk that it serves no-one at all, least of all lay members of the public for 
whom accessing government data is more than a matter of data exportability. In attending to 
this problem, future sociological work might advance an expanded definition of public ac-
cess, and place this at the heart of research and analysis. In the absence of such a critical 
perspective, the purpose of transparency remains vague, its outcomes difficult to assess, and 
its remit loose. Take the fact that, under the auspices of transparency, government openness 
is now regularly viewed as a means of helping companies become more knowledgeable and 
so, in many official documents, business leaders and citizens are imagined users of the same 
sets of government data (see, for example, Cabinet Office, 2012; Open Government Partner-
ship). That there might be substantial differences in each group’s needs and abilities to in-
terpret data — or that transforming transparency into a business asset might introduce com-
peting demands concerning which datasets get published — are considerations beyond the 
scope of twenty-first century transparency programmes. In turn, they are precisely the sort 
of considerations that might characterise a new sociology of institutional transparency. 
 
Assessing the limitations of transparency in facilitating government openness should also 
involve suggesting practical alternatives. This article has pointed to mechanisms for ‘struc-
tured skepticism’ (Papakostas, 2012) as one such possibility. Modern democratic states, Pa-
pakostas (2012) argues, must provide means of allowing a skeptical public to assess and 
make sense of official decisions and actions. In this model of state-citizen relations, the pub-
lic is conceived of as an inquisitive, critical, and active body, and the state has a central role 
in facilitating public scrutiny. This involves more than making the state’s work visible, it 
means making it intelligible and promoting the public’s ability to exercise a level of auton-
omy over what they look at and how. Papakostas (2012) identifies the creation and commu-
nication of coherent official rules as one such mechanism, pointing out that these offer the 
public a set of tools by which they might make sense of official decisions. The public’s 
physical presence at official fora is another mechanism, allowing them to exercise some 
control over their point of view as is, Forst (2014) suggests, a strengthened public sphere 
that promotes argumentation and clear through-routes for the public to challenge the official 
line.  
 
An important task of the sociology of institutional transparency is to identify and assess 
meaningful exercises in informing and engaging the public. As part of this project, it should 
seek to ascertain how late modern liberal democracies can transform the act of passive see-
ing into active scrutiny so as to facilitate something approaching ‘reciprocal transparency’ 
(Simmel, 1906). In doing so, sociological analyses should pay heed to Ezrahi’s (2004) ob-
servations about the performative basis of democracy and recognise that mechanisms for re-
ciprocal transparency work towards a political fiction, one that is ‘better’ in so much as it 
chimes with the late modern social imaginary. This article has suggested that transparency, 
as it is currently conceived, is a vestige of a now-outdated mode of instrumental politics. 
This is perhaps most evident in its flat denial that there are processes of selection at work in 
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making the state accessible to the public. This is a particularly grievous problem considering 
that, as Shilling and Mellor (2015) point out, late modernity has given rise to a strong sense 
that individuals and organisations are composed of different aspects or fronts, and are thus 
prone to deception. In such a social context, transparency’s claim to provide an open win-
dow to the work of the state — particularly clear in its privileging of liveness and directness 
— is likely to be treated as disingenuous and rhetorical.  
 
A sociology of institutional transparency would be usefully directed towards researching 
how the public engage with and make sense of the state through transparency initiatives. As 
well as establishing the effects of transparency, such an empirical base might help demon-
strate that the view of the state provided by transparency programmes is decidedly narrow. 
Of particular note is the way in which transparency programmes conflate the work of the 
state with official data produced by front-line state agencies. In doing so, they transform 
government openness into a matter of releasing information about discrete events that take 
place in official fora. Thus, government transparency allows us to find out how many people 
died at a given hospital, how many London-bound trains turned up on time in January, how 
many schoolchildren under-performed in a particular exam in 2015, and how much was 
spent by an MP on taxis. Amongst all this data, there are some things that are very evidently 
not on show, namely the structures and principles that underpin official decisions — or, put 
differently, the state as a system. The sheer volume of ‘pushed out’ data might mask this, 
but it also might give the impression that something important is being hidden. Either way, 
twenty-first century transparency is more likely to calcify than reduce the gap between the 
public and the state. Refocussing the policy and academic debate to make this a thoroughgo-
ing concern must be the chief task of a new sociology of institutional transparency. 
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